The world of 1914, as we see it now, reminds
us of Humpty Dumpty. Having climbed upon its
wall with difficulty, to keep from being involved
in every petty quarrel between nations and coalitions,
the world had somehow managed to sit
there for a hundred years. The status quo was
revised here and there occasionally by violence.
But the violence did not set back the hands of the
clock, defy economic laws, or, with the exception
of Alsace-Lorraine, make for international
political instability. The developments of the
nineteenth century were a logical growth, the result
of the working out of economic laws, which
means that thoughtful men and strong men led
virile national groups successfully because they
knew how to adapt their foreign policies to, and
shape them by, changing political, economic, and
social world conditions.
None was satisfied with Humpty Dumpty, but,
for fear of the consequences, all bolstered him
up and steadied him whenever he showed signs of
toppling. When he did fall, the first dismay
gave way to rejoicing. Now was our chance to
make him over again into what we wanted him
to be.
We forgot our nursery-rime. A new world order
became our battle-cry. The Central Empires
stood for the old order; the Entente Allies were
determined to make a clean sweep of the international
conditions that caused wars. Glibly repeated
from mouth to mouth “A war to end war”
was the phrase that appealed to our imagination.
How? By emancipating subject races, by resurrecting
submerged nations, by guaranteeing collectively
the independence of weak states and the
sanctity of treaties and international law.
We forgot our nursery-rime, I say. Some of
us had no intention of actually letting Humpty
Dumpty fall to pieces, and all of us thought we
could put him together again according to our
own plan and in a way that would suit us. But
when we entered the fray idealistic principles and
formulæ became weapons and not goals. Before
November 11, 1918, we used our principles solely
to break down the morale of our enemies; and
since the defeat of Germany instead of making
peace we have continued to juggle with our ideals
as we did in war-time. So the world is still actually
at war. The treaties forced upon the vanquished
enemies have not been taken seriously.
One of them has already come up for drastic
revision and the others are not being fully enforced.
In justification of their unwillingness to apply
in making peace the principles they had solemnly
pledged themselves to use as the basis of the
treaties, Entente statesmen had no grounds for
claiming either (a) that the American President
and his nation, late comers in the war, wrongly
interpreted and formulated the Entente war aims,
or (b) that the fulfilment of their promises was
contingent upon American coöperation. Self-determination,
the resurrection of subject nations,
the rectification of frontiers to satisfy irredentist
aspirations, may have been doctrines
promulgated in a small measure as a gallery appeal
to public opinion at home and abroad; but
the main reason was to break down the internal
military unity of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and
Turkey. These doctrines were not inspired by
President Wilson or other American ideologues,
nor were they proclaimed with the idea that the
United States would help to carry them out.
It was not intended that they should be carried
out. But the new forces set loose were too
strong to control. Peoples all over the world
clamored for rights and privileges that it was
the purpose to grant only to peoples that had been
subject to the vanquished powers. To this cause
of confusion, unrest, conspiracy, and open rebellion,
were added the falling out of the victors
over the spoils of war and the determination of
France and some of the smaller nations to apply
the law of retaliation to their now defenseless
oppressors.
These are the three reasons why Europe since
1918 has not found peace. The League of Nations
is impotent, with or without the United
States as a member, to restore Europe to peace
until the three Furies—Vanity, Greed, and Revenge—cease
raging.
After the World War the movement in the
United States to induce the American people to
underwrite the Paris peace settlement did not succeed.
The overwhelming rejection of their panacea
for the ills of the world did not discourage
the supporters of the Versailles Covenant.
After four years they are returning to the campaign
for American participation in the Versailles
League. Since they cannot disguise the seriousness
of conditions in Europe as the fourth year
of the functioning of the League of Nations
draws to a close, the earnest League propagandists,
to get away from the remorseless logic of
“By their fruits ye shall know them,” now assert
that Europe’s troubles are our fault. We refused
to ratify the treaty and enter the League
of Nations; ergo, all these things have happened.
The writer, an observer and student of European
affairs for fifteen years, has never had an
ax to grind or theories and national causes to
advance and champion. In the Near East during
the years leading up to the World War, in
Paris during the World War and the Peace Conference,
and following the aftermath of the war
since the treaties were signed, his sole ambition
has been to record what he has observed. He
is not pro-anything. He feels, as he did when he
wrote “The New Map of Europe” in 1914, “The
New Map of Africa” in 1916, and “The New
Map of Asia” in 1919, that a host of people are
seeking an unbiased presentation of contemporary
events, so that sentimentality will not obscure
common sense in forming their opinion on
the important problem of America’s place in the
world and America’s duty toward the world.
We must know how things actually are in order
that we may help effectively to make them what
they ought to be.
Herbert Adams Gibbons.
Princeton, September, 1923.
